Three models have dominated recent research on the relationship between labor unions, wage behavior, and national economic performance: a simple linear model, a parabolic model, and a political model. This article argues that an unemployment-mediated linear model is theoretically preferable. In a context oflow unemployment, encompassing labor movements can be expected to restrain wage demands, whereas localized unions have much less incentive to do so. In a context of high unemployment, localized unions should exhibit wage moderation, and the pressure on encompassing unions to restrain wage demands is further accentuated. These four models are assessed as predictors of wage changes, inflation, and misery index levels for 15 industrialized nations over the periods 1960-1973, 1974-1979, and 1980-1990. The linear models outperform the parabolic and political models in each of the latter two time periods. For the midto late 1970s the simple linear model performs best, but for the 1980s the unemployment-mediated linear model proves superior. None of the models has any explanatory utility for the pre-oil shock period.
restraint. The second asserts that the relationship is parabolic rather than linear; restraint occurs in both highly centralized and decentralized cases, whereas intermediate, industry-level bargaining induces wage militancy. The third version contends that wage moderation by encompassing labor movements is contingent on the presence of leftist government or low unemployment.
I argue that each of these models has important theoretical flaws, and I offer an alternative model in which wage behavior is determined by both labor organization and the unemployment context. Union wage demands are a linear function of labor movement encompassingness but are also influenced by the existing level of unemployment. Encompassing unionization and high, rather than low, unemployment are each conducive to restraint. To observe the true effect of labor organization, therefore, unemployment must be held constant. Given a particular unemployment context, encompassing labor movements are more likely than narrow, localized unions to restrain wage demands.
This article offers an empirical assessment of these four alternative theories of the relationship between labor organization, wage behavior, and economic performance. The first section describes the three versions of the new institutional view. The second outlines my unemployment-mediated linear model. I then turn, in the next two sections, to empirical assessment of the four models. A brief conclusion follows.
THE INSTITUTIONAL VIEW ON UNIONS AND WAGES
The conventional economic view suggests that unions frequently drive wages above marginal productivity levels, thereby contributing to inferior aggregate economic outcomes. l If there must be unions, small, localized unions are considered preferable. Free to take into account the circumstances of their particular firm or plant, localized unions are expected to exhibit greater flexibility and accommodation in negotiating compensation levels. In Assar Lindbeck's (1990) words: "Decentralized bargaining at the level of individual firms ... is, in the long run, the system most conducive to wage moderation, as local unions then have to consider the economic situation of each individual firm separately" (p. 332). Larger, more encompassing unions, with greater size and strength, are expected to be more aggressive and rigid 1. Unions are thought by some analysts to have other, positive effects that can potentially outweigh the damage inflicted by excessive wage demands. See Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Mishel and Voos (1992) . in wage bargaining. In a competitive international economy, then, nations with more powerful unions should exhibit inferior macroeconomic performance results.
During the 1980s the scholarly popularity of this view subsided considerably, as a new perspective on the relationship between labor organization and economic performance took hold (Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange, 1991; Bean, Layard, & Nickell, 1986; Bruno & Sachs, 1985, chap. 11; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Cameron, 1984; Castles, 1987; Crepaz, 1992; Crouch, 1985; Freeman, 1988; Golden, 1993; Hicks, 1988; Jackman, 1990; Lange, 1984; Lange & Garrett, 1985; Moene & Wallerstein, 1993; Newell & Symons, 1987; Paloheimo, 1990; Schmidt, 1982; Soskice, 1990; Tarantelli, 1986; Wallerstein, 1990) . The new view suggests that strong, coordinated union movements are prone to wage moderation rather than militancy. I call this view "institutional" because it takes into account the way the incentives facing labor organizations differ according to their size and structure and the economic and political context in which they act. The institutional perspective has three different, although related, versions. 2 
SIMPLE LINEAR MODEL
The key to all three versions of the institutional view is the existence of externalities in the wage-bargaining process that result in locally optimal actions producing collectively suboptimal outcomes. Aggressive wage demands, if successful, in many instances will be passed on by firms in the form of higher prices, which may contribute to inflation, thereby nullifying the wage gains. In addition, the country's firms may price themselves out of the international market, resulting in some having to shut down, leaving workers unemployed. High wage increases may also reduce the profit available for reinvestment, which is a key source of future wage gains. Encompassing unions, which bargain for large portions of the workforce, can and must take these considerations into account. They are constrained by their organizational status to do so. Hence they are likely to moderate wage demands.
According to what I call the simple linear model, localized unions have less incentive for restraint. It is inflation's public good (or bad) properties that 2. These models rely implicitly on several assumptions. One is that the principal aim of worker organizations is to maximize the material welfare of their members, which consists of some stable combination of (present and future) wages and employment. A second is that unions face no formal constraints on their choice of wage-bargaining strategy. A third is that union demands are largely, if not entirely, determinative of wage developments. For some complications arising from relaxation of the third assumption, see Moene and Wallerstein (1993) . are most commonly said to encourage narrow, localized unions to push for large wage increases (e.g., Crouch, 1985, p. 107; Flanagan, Soskice, & Ulman, 1983, pp. 27-28; Tarantelli, 1986, pp. 2_3) .3 The incentive structure facing such unions approximates that of a Prisoner's Dilemma, as depicted in Figure 1 . Aggressive bargaining for a localized union (union A in the figure) is rational on purely defensive grounds; if workers in other firms win high wage increases, there likely will be considerable economy-wide price inflation, so it needs a comparable wage increase just to break even (upper-left cell). And if it succeeds in getting a high wage raise while other unions do not, the result will be higher pay in conjunction with low inflation, which is the optimal outcome among the various possibilities (upper-right cell).
Rather than a Prisoner's Dilemma, the incentive structure may in some instances resemble that of a game of "deadlock," in which a noncooperative solution is favored by one party (or both) no matter what the other's preferences are. That is, localized unions may prefer mutual defection to mutual cooperation, because obtaining a high wage increase with high inflation may be viewed as preferable to a low wage increase with low inflation. Because the raison d'etre of a worker organization is to win gains for its members, if wage moderation offers no identifiable payoff, it may be difficult to justify. In other words, if real wages are likely to be the same irrespective of union 3. Because most localized unions organize the bulk of the workforce within a company or plant, the reinvestment externality does not apply (see Olson, 1982, p. 49) . For craft unions, however, this is not the case. Craft unions, which are prominent in Britain but less so elsewhere, frequently organize only a small portion of a company's workforce. Because its members' skills are often in strong demand, a craft union has little stake in the survival of any particular firm and hence has a strong incentive to seek redistributive gains from the company in the form of high wages. Incentives related to unemployment are generally overlooked by proponents of the simple linear view, as discussed below.
bargaining strategy, organizational (as opposed to economic) considerations might lead localized unions to demand high wage increases.
The simple linear version of the institutional view thus offers a set of predictions diametrically opposite to those suggested by the conventional economic perspective. Localized unions, which enjoy the organizational freedom to pursue the narrow concerns of their own members, often find it in their interest to bargain aggressively for high wage increases. Encompassing unions, because they are constrained to take into account the interests of a large mass of workers, tend rationally to moderate wage demands. This moderation may be disrupted by wage drift-that is, by firm-level affiliates of an encompassing labor organization bargaining for wages in excess of centrally established levels. 4 However, encompassing unions should be expected to take this into account and to further restrain their own demands accordingly (Calmfors, 1990, p. 57; Elster, 1989, p. 179) .
PARABOLIC MODEL
A second version of the institutional view, first elaborated by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) , accepts the point about the impact of encompassingness and centralized wage setting but contends that extreme decentralization also leads to wage moderation. Wage militancy is said to occur in intermediate cases, where bargaining is conducted primarily at the industry level. The relationship between labor organization and wage outcomes is thus parabolic rather than linear (see also Freeman, 1988; Moene & Wallerstein, 1993; Paloheimo, 1990; Pohjola, 1992) .
The major addition ofthe Calmfors-Driffill model concerns the potential effects of wage demands on employment. When a localized union wins a high wage increase from its firm, one of two things typically happens: Either that increase is passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices or the firm is left with less profit to reinvest. Each may make the firm less competitive, reducing sales and leading to job cutbacks. In terms of welfare maximization, a job and a pay hike are lexicographically ordered; that is, a wage raise is possible only if one has a job. Given this consideration, it is rational for a local union not to push for substantial pay increases, for fear that such a strategy will result in fewer jobs for its members.
If wage settlements are conducted at the industry level, the employment effects of a high wage raise are, according to Calmfors and Driffill, substantially less. Because negotiated wage levels apply to all firms across an industry, all can afford to raise prices without losing sales. 5 Hence there is little incentive for wage moderation.
The same logic applies to centralized unions that encompass a variety of industries. Here again firms can afford to raise prices in response to high wage increases, because the price rise will occur throughout the economy and consumers, in the Caimfors-Driffill model, have no available substitute for these products. All else being equal, encompassing unions would therefore exhibit extreme wage militancy. As the simple linear model points out, however, economy-wide wage increases have immediate inflationary effects (whereas industry-wide increases may not). This discourages wage militancy by encompassing labor organizations (Calmfors & Driffill, 1988, p. 34) .
POLITICAL MODEL
A third version of the institutional view holds that wage restraint by encompassing unions is contingent on the presence of a leftist government, low unemployment, or both. Lange and Garrett (1985) argue that left government is needed to offer labor the certainty that foregone wages will be reinvested rather than invested abroad or wasted on consumption or speculation (pp. 798-800). Crouch (1985) suggests that left government helps "push centralized economic interests into a cooperative rather than a combative logic" (p. 113). Others contend that encompassing unions restrain wage demands as part of a "political exchange" for low unemployment, a higher social wage, and/or greater input into policy making (Bruno & Sachs, 1985, p. 231; Cameron, 1984, pp. 171-174; Castles, 1987, p. 383; Newell & Symons, 1987, p. 579; Schmidt, 1982, p. 241; Tarantelli, 1986, p. 5) .
Most analysts who assert that the political context matters implicitly suggest that, of the four possible combinations of labor organization and political context, the only one conducive to wage restraint is that of encompassing unions with a left-dominated government. An important exception is Lange and Garrett (1985; Alvarez et aI., 1991) , who argue that wage moderation will also occur where localized unions operate in conjunction with a government dominated by a conservative party (or a coalition of such parties) that pursues free-market policies.
5. As Calmfors and Driffill (1988) note:
Each firm within the industry has the same incentive to raise its output price which, therefore, rises in the whole industry. Substitution now occurs only in relation to firms outside the industry, and no firm faces a fall in demand relative to other firms in the same industry. The consequence is that the elasticity of demand for labour with respect to the nominal wage becomes lower. (p. 33) If labor is particularly weak organizationally and in politics, it is likely that something akin to the pure play of the market will ensue. . . . Even though workers' expectations about their future material interest would dictate militancy in the market, their organizational and political weakness reduces their ability to disrupt the capitalist growth process. (Lange & Garrett, 1985, p. 801) In the Lange-Garrett model, therefore, wage moderation occurs in "coherent" political-economic contexts: where encompassing labor movements coexist with leftist governments and where localized unions are combined with rightist governments. Figure 2 summarizes the predictions of the simple linear, parabolic, and political versions of the institutional view.
AN UNEMPLOYMENT-MEDIATED LINEAR MODEL
Each of these three models has a crucial theoretical flaw. The weakness of the simple linear model is that noted by Calmfors and Driffill-narnely, its neglect of the employment effects of wage militancy by localized unions. This gives localized unions a strong incentive to restrain wage increases.
This point is only partially correct, however, because it overlooks the impact of variation in the unemployment context. The threat of job losses is likely to deter wage militancy by localized unions only in conditions of substantial unemployment. 6 If the economy is at or near full employment, it is much less difficult for workers to find another job if they are displaced. Thus a localized union in these circumstances need not to be so concerned about the effects of wage increases on its firm's competitiveness. Hence its incentive to restrain wage demands is minimized.
The Calmfors-Driffill parabolic model has two additional flaws. First, it assumes a closed economy. Calmfors and Driffill's hypothesis that industrylevel bargaining engenders wage militancy depends on an assumption that, as long as aU firms within the industry raise prices, none suffers, because consumers have no available substitute for their products. In an integrated world economy, however, that is not true. If all German automakers raise prices to compensate for high wage increases, they will (likely) lose sales to Japanese and U.S. competitors. As a result, the jobs of German autoworkers will be threatened. In an open economy with international competition, therefore, the potential employment effects of wage militancy are the same whether bargaining is conducted at the firm, industry, or national level. Of course, not all industries are exposed to foreign competition. But many are.
In any case, in several countries where wage bargaining formally occurs at the industry level-including Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium-a high degree of union concentration along with wage leadership on the part of important industries renders the wage-setting process highly coordinated (Golden, 1993, p. 442; Soskice, 1990, pp. 43-46; Streeck, 1993; Visser, 1990, chap. 9) . Golden (1993, esp. pp. 440-441) has argued that the degree oflabor movement concentration, or unity, is of equal if not greater importance than centralization in producing the incentives and capacities associated with organizational encompassingness. Where the number of labor organizations engaging in, or guiding, wage bargaining is small and these unions do not compete with one another for members, coordination among unions in the wage-bargaining process is greatly facilitated, even if there is little formal centralization of decision making.
The German case is a good illustration. Germany has a single dominant national labor federation, the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB, Federa-6. Fritz Scharpf (1987) is, to my knowledge, alone in having noted this. He writes, for instance:
Job losses, unlike inflation, are primarily experienced not as a collective evil but as an individual risk whose avoidance is in the immediate self-interest of individual workers and hence not vulnerable to free-riding. As soon as unemployment is allowed to rise [italics added], therefore, ... there is no reason to assume that decentralized and fragmented union movements that are otherwise characterized by greater militancy should be any less "docile" than highly centralized and disciplined corporatist unions are said to be. (p. 253) tion of German Trade Unions). Although wages are negotiated at the industry level (i.e., bargaining is not highly centralized), the DGB encourages other industries to follow the pattern set by the large metalworkers' union, IG (Industriegewerkschaft) Metall, and they typically do so. Moreover, extension laws extend collective bargaining results to nonunion firms. IG Metall thus faces the incentives and constraints of an encompassing organization; it is effectively bargaining for a very large share of the workforce. As Streeck (1993) notes, the metalworkers' union knows that the other sectors will likely follow its lead, and that the employment of its members depends to a large extent on the propensity of businesses in these sectors to invest. IG Metall is thus forced by self-interest to conceive its collective bargaining strategies in a macro-economic framework. (p. 17)
Also helpful is the fact that both blue-and white-collar workers, as well as both private-and public-sector employees, are represented by the DGB; this contains competitive bargaining among these sectors of the labor force. Overall, the degree of coordination achieved is similar to that in nations such as Norway or Sweden that have traditionally featured highly centralized wage bargaining. In effect, then, the labor movements in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium, which are classified as intermediate cases by Calmfors and Driffill, behave like encompassing organizations.
The political model's weakness is that it underestimates the incentives imposed on encompassing labor movements by their organizational character. As it happens, encompassing unions often do coexist empirically with leftist or labor governments that pursue full employment. This was almost universally true during the 1960s and 1970s. However, the notion that this empirical correlation is of causal importance seems mistaken. Given that encompassing unions are forced by their organizational structure to take into account the long-term interests of the broad mass of workers, neither left government nor low unemployment would appear necessary to spur wage moderation. Indeed, encompassing unions should exhibit greater restraint under conditions of high unemployment. In a context of international competitive pressure, high wage increases throughout an economy result in not only inflation but also job losses. If a substantial share of the workforce is already unemployed, new jobs for the displaced will be all the more difficult to find (assuming the cross-border mobility of labor is limited). The organizational character of encompassing labor unions forces them to internalize such effects, thereby encouraging wage restraint. Combined with the threat of high inflation, the prospect of increasing an already high jobless rate should lead encompassing unions to moderate wage demands even more than they would in a low unemployment context. These considerations imply a revised set of expectations regarding the relationship between labor organization and wage behavior. I suggest that the structure of incentives facing unions is as follows: In a context of low unemployment, encompassing labor movements can be expected to restrain wage demands, whereas narrow, localized unions have much less incentive to do so. In a context of high unemployment, wage moderation by localized unions is quite reasonable, and the pressure on encompassing unions to restrain wage demands should be even further accentuated. In other words, wage behavior is a linear function of both labor organization and the unemployment context. Figure 3 summarizes these incentives.
The aim of this article is to determine which of these four models, if any, is best able to account for variation in wage behavior and economic performance across industrialized nations.
DATA AND METHOD
To assess the explanatory utility of the various models I estimate regression equations using ordinary least squares (OLS). The analysis is crosssectional and covers the periods 1960-1973, 1974-1979, and 1980-1990 . The time periods are analyzed separately because of the profound disparity in economic circumstances in the years divided by the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 (Maddison, 1989 and because a number of important changes in government partisanship occurred around 1980. Fifteen nations are included: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, (West) Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The countries were selected to control for level of development; included are all but two Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations that throughout the 1960-1990 period had a level of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at least half as large as that of the world's richest nation (Switzerland or the United States, depending on the year). Japan and Switzerland qualify according to this criterion, but I exclude them from most of the analysis for reasons discussed below. 7 The dependent variables are nominal wage changes and inflation. I examine averages within each of the three time periods as well as change from one period to the next. The latter is included to help control for the fact that performance in a given time period is frequently in part a function of performance in a previous period. For this change variable I use the average for a period divided by that of the preceding period. s Definitions and data sources for these and other variables are listed in the appendix.
Inflation is measured as increases in the consumer price index. Wage changes can be operationalized in two ways. One is wage increases. The other is change in unit labor costs, which refers to change in wages minus change in productivity. The correlations between these two measures for the 15 countries over 1960-1973, 1974-1979, and 1980-1990 are .79, .96, and .98 , suggesting that the choice of which to use makes relatively little difference. I prefer the unit labor cost measure, because it is wage increases in excess of increases in productivity that are thought to have deleterious effects on macroeconomic performance.
Unfortunately, available data on wage changes cover only the manufacturing sector. 9 For this reason, many investigators have been hesitant to use these data. Indeed, most previous research has analyzed only the association between labor organization and economic performance, taking it for granted that the purported causal link, wage restraint, occurs as hypothesized (e.g., Alvarez et aI., 1991; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Castles, 1987; Crepaz, 1992; Crouch, 1985; Golden, 1993; Hicks, 1988; Lange & Garrett, 1985; Paloheimo, 1990; Schmidt, 1982; Soskice, 1990; Tarantelli, 1986) . However, although only one third or so of the workforce is employed in manufacturing in most industrialized countries, the manufacturing sector traditionally plays the role of wage leader, with other sectors following, to a greater or lesser degree, the patterns set there. Wage developments in manufacturing thus represent a 7. OEeD members Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey fail to qualify on the basis of per capita wealth. I exclude Iceland and Luxembourg because of their extremely small popUlations-less than 500,000 each.
8. This is preferable to a measure that subtracts the previous period average because it does not unduly disadvantage countries with very strong performance in an earlier period or advantage those with poor prior results.
9. Also, the particular industries included differ slightly from country to country.
reasonable, although plainly imperfect, proxy for developments in the nation as a whole. Empirical studies frequently find that wage demands are influenced by the expected rate of inflation (e.g., Mitchell, 1980; Rubin, 1986) . Some would therefore argue that I should be looking at real, rather than nominal, wage trends. I use nominal figures for two reasons. First, a prominent line of research suggests that workers and unions often focus on nominal wage levels (Mitchell, 1993) . Second, and more important, wage increases are frequently as much or more a cause of inflation than a consequence. To suggest, for instance, that nominal wage (or unit labor cost) increases have tended to be relatively high in Italy or Britain because inflation has been high is to put the cart before the horse. If rapid wage gains cause rapid price increases, which then contribute to further rapid wage increases, it makes little sense to attribute the wage patterns to inflation. This sort of "tug-of-war" sparked by wage pressures has been a common feature of inflationary episodes, particularly thatofthemid-tolate 1970s (Crouch &Pizzorno, 1978; Flanagan etal., 1983; Lindberg & Maier, 1985) .10 The correlations between nominal unit labor cost changes and inflation for the 15 countries are very strong: .70 for 1960-1973, .94 for 1974-1979, and .91 for 1980-1990. (For real unit labor cost changes, by contrast, they are -.07, .14, and -.33.) A wage-push perspective, which underlies all theories linking labor organization to macroeconomic performance, views this association as largely a product of wage developments influencing prices rather than vice versa.
Most previous research in this area has treated unemployment as one of the principal outcomes of differences in labor organization (Alvarez et aI., 1991; Bean et aI., 1986; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988; Cameron, 1984; Castles, 1987; Crepaz, 1992; Newell & Symons, 1987; Paloheimo, 1990; Schmidt, 1982; Soskice, 1990; Tarantelli, 1986) . However, although associations, in some cases quite strong, have been found between various measures of labor organization and unemployment performance, the connection between these variables, if genuine, does not appear to be a result of wage restraint. The correlations between unit labor cost changes and unemployment for the 15 countries over 1960-1973, 1974-1979, and 1980-1990are-.52, .19, and-.13 . If wage behavior had the causal effect on unemployment posited by most observers, these correlations should be strongly positive. Furthermore, recent investigations suggest convincingly that cross-country variation in unem-10. Michael Smith (1992) is correct in emphasizing that wage pressures can only lead to inflation if accommodated by monetary authorities. This issue is discussed below. ployment levels is determined largely by state policy (Korpi, 1991; Therbom, 1986) .
Another possible performance indicator is growth. This is the variable for which the Lange-Garrett political model has been found to have explanatory success (Beck, Katz, Alvarez, Garrett, & Lange, 1993) . Growth, however, is affected by so many factors that its theoretical link with wage behavior is tenuous. The data support this skepticism. The correlations between unit labor cost changes and per capita growth for the three time periods are .13, -.13, and .11.11
The main independent variable for each model is a labor organization index. These are shown in Table 1 . Unions vary according to structure and size. The former refers to the degree of centralization and/or concentration of the union movement; the latter refers to union density, that is, the share of the labor force that is unionized. Table 2 provides data for each of these dimensions. The indexes for union concentration and centralization are from Cameron (1984 , Table 7 .6); they represent his scoring for the "organizational unity of labor" and "confederation power in collective bargaining," respectively. Concentration is an inverse function of (a) the number of national labor confederations and (b) the number of unions affiliated with each of the confederations. Centralization denotes the degree to which central confederations (a) consult with unions about wage negotiations prior to collective bargaining, (b) participate directly in collective bargaining, (c) possess the right to veto negotiated settlements, and (d) control the distribution of strike funds for unions (Cameron, 1984, p. 164 ). Cameron's indexes are the most widely used in the literature and likely the most accurate (see Golden, 1993) . The union density data represent averages for the years 1970 and 1980 , from Visser (1991 .1).
A number of researchers combine these three dimensions into a unitary index, often labeled "corporatism." 12 Rather than follow this approach, I shall use, for the two linear models, Cameron's union concentration index. The rationale for this choice is as follows: In the realm of wage bargaining, union structure matters more than size. As noted earlier, in several countries with relatively low levels of unionization, including Germany and the Netherlands, extension laws extend union wage settlements to nonunionized workers (Streeck, 1993; van Voorden, 1984, p. 226) . Collectively bargained wages 11. For both unemployment and growth, similar results are obtained using real unit labor cost (or wage) changes.
12. In some cases other dimensions, such as the scope of collective bargaining or the presence of works councils, are added to, or used instead of, these three. thus tend to cover a larger portion of the workforce than is indicated by union density figures. How, then, should labor movement structure be operationalized? Centralization and concentration each encourage unions to act as encompassing organizations. One could, therefore, average the scores for these two variables to create an index of encompassingness (e.g., Visser, 1990, chap. 9) . Concentration and centralization are, however, functional substitutes rather than merely complements; each is sufficient, but not necessary, to generate the incentives and capacities characteristic of an encompassing organization. A country such as Germany, which has a highly concentrated but relatively decentralized labor movement, would thus be scored too low by averaging the scores for concentration and centralization. Instead, it makes more sense to take the higher of the two scores. As it happens, for all 15 countries the Cameron score for union concentration is equal to or greater than the score for centralization. Taking the highest score for each country thus amounts in practice to simply using the union concentration index. Cameron does not provide a score for New Zealand. I have assigned it the same score as Australia, as Calmfors and Driffill (1988, Table 4 ) do. Analyses of the relationship between labor organization and economic performance typically assume that the former is constant over time. Recent research suggests that this is a reasonable assumption. There has indeed been relatively little change in labor movement concentration in these 15 nations during the past several decades (Lange, Wallerstein, & Golden, 1995; Visser, 1990, chap. 7) . Change has occurred in some countries, but developments have offset one another so that the overall degree of concentration has not shifted. In Sweden and the other Nordic nations, for instance, the share of union members accounted for by the largest confederation has declined in the 1980s; at the same time, the number of affiliates to the major confederations has decreased (Lange et aI., 1995) . I therefore follow the pattern in the literature of using a uniform labor organization index across the various time periods.
Wage-setting institutions in Japan and Switzerland differ profoundly from those in the other 15 rich industrialized countries. These two nations have low-density, fragmented union movements, but as Soskice (1990) has noted, the wage-setting process in each is nevertheless highly coordinated (pp. 41-43). This coordination is engineered by encompassing, cohesive employer federations, typically with union cooperation. Several analysts have argued that in Japan and Switzerland-as in other nations with relatively weak, decentralized union movements-"market discipline" produces wage moderation (e.g., Alvarez et aI., 1991, p. 541; Calmfors & Driffill, 1988, pp. 15, 33) . However, this view ignores the extensive coordination that characterizes the wage-bargaining process in these two nations. To the extent they exhibit wage restraint, it is, arguably, a result of cooperation among encompassing employer organizations rather than the discipline of the market. 13 Because of this peculiar institutional arrangement, Japan and Switzerland are properly considered in a different light than the other countries. I therefore exclude them from most of the analysis. Switzerland cannot be included in any case because of a lack of reliable data on unemployment, which is a key variable in the unemployment-mediated model. 14 The labor organization index is the only causal variable in the equations for the simple linear model. The equations for the unemployment-mediated model include this index along with a variable representing the average unemployment rate during the time period in question. If this model is superior, adding the unemployment variable should yield a larger coefficient for the labor organization variable and increase the amount of variation in wage changes and inflation explained. The coefficient should be larger because, according to the model, encompassing unions are not universally 13. Soskice (1990 . Table 1 ) has created an index of economy-wide wage-bargaining coordination that he believes is analytically superior to models relying on indexes of union centralization and/or concentration. However. he provides scores for only 11 countries. without any claim that they constitute a random or even representative sample. This makes it impossible to conduct a fair test of his thesis.
14. Most Swiss workers are not eligible for unemployment insurance and therefore have no incentive to register as unemployed when out of work. Furthermore. Switzerland makes considerable use of immigrant labor on temporary work contracts. When jobless. these workers typically return to their country of origin and so are not counted as unemployed. Because these institutional peculiarities produce an extreme bias in Swiss unemployment figures (see Blaas. 1992) . the OBCn does not list these data. more likely than localized unions to exhibit wage moderation; they are more likely to do so only given a particular ullemployment context. Thus, for instance, the model predicts that encompassing unions in a low unemployment context and localized unions in a high unemployment environment should exhibit comparable restraint. Given a low (or high) unemployment context, however, encompassing labor movements should exhibit greater moderation than localized, unions (see Figure 3 above ). Controlling for unemployment should thus produce a stronger effect for the labor organization variable. The adjusted R2 should be higher for the unemployment-mediated model because unemployment matters; including it should heighten the model's explanatory power. IS Calmfors and Driffill provide their own combined ranking of labor move~ ment centralization and concentration. To test their parabolic hypothesis, they rearrange the ranking so that the most and least centralized cases are ranked first, the next most and least centralized are ranked second, and so on (see Table 1 above). I use their revised ranking as the sole independent variable in the equations for their model.
Lange and Garrett test their political model using an interaction regression equation with three main independent variables: a labor organization variable, a government partisanship variable, and a multiplicative combination of these two. Their labor organization index has two components: "centralization," which is the average of Cameron's scores for union concentration, union centralization, and the scope of collective bargaining; and union IS. The notion that unemployment mediates the effect of labor organization on wage behavior suggests that perhaps a multiplicative interaction term for these two variables should be included in the regression equations. That is, however, not an appropriate strategy here. An interaction effect exists when the impact of one independent variable depends on the value of another independent variable (technically, when the slope of the relationship between an independent variable and the dependent variable varies according to the value of another independent variable). This is the case in the Lange-Garrett political model, in which encompassing unionism is said to be beneficial in a context of a leftist government but detrimental where the Right governs. In the unemployment-mediated model an interaction effect would occur if, for example, union encompassingness induced restraint in a high unemployment context but militancy in a low unemployment environment, or if the difference in wage behavior between encompassing versus localized unions was greater in a high unemployment context than in a low unemployment context.
The model, however, suggests no such effect; differences in labor organization have the same type and degree of impact in both unemployment contexts. What the model posits is that encompassing union organization does not automatically produce greater wage moderation than does localized unionism; that is true only within a given unemployptent context. In other words, unemployment's effect on wage behavior may hide some of the effect that labor organization has. Thus to assess the true impact of variation in labor organization. it is necessary to control for unemployment. density, also taken from Cameron (1984 , Table 7 .6). The labor organization index is the sum of the standardized scores for these two components (see Table 1 above). Government partisanship is measured as the average share of cabinet portfolios held by leftist parties during the time period in question. Following Alvarez et al. (1991) , I use data provided by Swank (1992) for this variable.
FINDINGS REGRESSION RESULTS FOR THE FOUR MODELS
For the 1960-1973 period, none of the models has any success in accounting for cross-national variation in wage changes or inflation (not shown here). A number of the coefficients have the wrong sign, and none of the equations produces an adjusted If greater than .2O-indeed, only two of the eight are greater than .10. 16 Thus, although the 1960s are considered by some to have been the heyday of corporatism and coordinated wage bargaining (e.g., Crepaz, 1992) , structural differences in national labor movements do not appear to have contributed to varying economic performance during that decade. This finding justifies the emphasis in the literature on the post-1973 period.
Results for 1974-1979 and 1980-1990 are presented in Table 3 . Because the labor organization variable is operationalized differently in the various models and two of the models include additional variables, the coefficients are not strictly comparable. They do, however, give us an idea of the relative utility of the models. I? The adjusted R 2 s offer a more direct means of comparison.
The parabolic (Calmfors-Driffill) model has little explanatory strength. With average rates of unit labor cost changes and inflation as the dependent variables, all of the regression coefficients have the predicted sign, but none is particularly large or statistically significant. The equations explain virtually 16. Because data are not available prior to 1960, it is not possible to examine change in unit labor cost increases and inflation vis-a-vis the previous period. The dependent variables here are thus only average rates of unit labor cost increase and inflation during the 1960-1973 period. There are eight equations-two for each of the four models.
17. The group of countries examined here constitutes a population rather than a sample, which calls into question the relevance of significance tests in assessing regression coefficients. Such tests do, however, help to distinguish probable associations from those that could arise randomly. Hence we are on firmer ground in drawing inferences based not only on the coefficient signs and magnitudes but also on their significance levels. none of the variation in wage changes and inflation. For changes from one period to the next the parabolic model fares even worse, with three of the four coefficients having the wrong sign. The political (Lange-Garrett) model fares no better. The labor organization coefficient in this model is expected to be positive (see Alvarez et aI., 1991, p. 547) . Five of the eight labor organization coefficients have the wrong sign, however, and the other three are quite weak:. The R 2 s are all fairly small. If
Cameron's concentration index is used instead of the Lange-Garrett operationalization of the labor organization variable,18 significant negative coefficients result in six of the eight equations (not shown here). This suggests that labor organization, as measured by union concentration, induces wage restraint irrespective of the political context.
The two linear models perform much better. For 1974 For -1979 , the labor organization coefficients for each are large and significant at the 5% level or better for average rates of both unit labor cost changes and inflation. The simple and unemployment-mediated linear models explain roughly one fourth to one third of the cross-national variation in these performance indicators (taking degrees of freedom into account). A similar pattern holds for changes in these indicators, except that the R 2 s for both models are higher.
For the 1974-1979 time period the unemployment variable adds little or nothing to the model. Its coefficients have inconsistent signs, and the adjusted R2 decreases slightly with the variable included.
For the 1980s, however, the unemployment variable produces a stark difference between the two linear models. Although the simple model again performs reasonably well in explaining average rates of unit labor cost change and inflation, the coefficients for the labor organization variable in the unemployment-mediated model are twice as large and the model accounts for three times as much of the variation in the dependent variables. For changes from one period to the next the simple model fares poorly, whereas the unemployment-mediated model continues to do very well. The coefficient in the unit labor cost equation for the latter is significant at only the 15% level, but this may be partly a result of measurement error (i.e., the fact that data on wage changes cover only the manufacturing sector). These results suggest that, for the 1980s at least, the unemployment context clearly influences the effect of differences in labor organization on wage behavior.
To check the robustness of these results for the two linear models, I reestimated the equations using two alternative measures of labor organization. One is an average of the Cameron scores for union concentration and 18. Because there are so many tie scores in Cameron's union concentration index, it carmot be used as an alternative operationalization in testing the parabolic model. centralization. The other is an index based on 12 indexes and rankings of corporatism or labor movement encompassingness from the literature, which were standardized, summed, then standardized again (Crepaz, 1992, Table 1 ). The differences in results between the two models (not shown here) parallel those obtained using the Cameron concentration index. For the [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] period the coefficients and R 2 s are similar for the two models, whereas for the 1980s they are each much higher for the unemployment-mediated model. This offers further indication that the unemployment context mattered during the 1980s. Its importance is not a function of the particular operationalization of union encompassingness.
Why does unemployment appear to have had little or no impact on wage behavior and inflation during the 1974-1979 period? Advocates of monetarist theory contend that the simultaneous occurrence of high unemployment and high inflation in these years demonstrates the fallacy of the Phillips Curve assumption of a trade-off between the two (Friedman, 1977) . But the phenomenon of stagflation during this period may simply have been the result of an exceptional concurrence of developments, including the 1973 oil price shock, international monetary instability following the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate regime in 1972-1973, a dramatic increase in foreign competition because of the rapid expansion of international trade, the emergence of locked-in inflationary expectations, and widespread policy incoherence. Most important, because of the sustained economic advance of the 1950s and 1960s, workers and unions believed that the decline in demand beginning in 1973-1974 was merely temporary. Hence rising unemployment had little initial effect on wage demands (Flanagan et aI., 1983) . It was not until the 1980s that wages adjusted. Performance patterns in the 1960s and 1980s suggest that the mid-to late 1970s may be best viewed as a temporary exception to the inflation-unemployment trade-off.
Japan, which has a low density, fragmented union movement, experienced moderate rates of unit labor cost increases and inflation during [1974] [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] and very low rates in the 1980s. Including it in the analysis might thus be expected to improve the performance of the parabolic model, but it does not (results not shown here). The labor organization coefficients and R 2 s change only marginally, and in some cases in the wrong direction. Because it experienced uninterrupted rightist government throughout the past three decades, Japan also represents a key case for the political model. With Japan included the coefficients for this model generally have the expected signs, but most are far from significance and the R 2 s are very low.
Japan's inclusion has little effect on either of the linear models for the 1974-1979 period; the coefficients for the labor organization variable remain significant at the 5% level and the amount of variation explained is reduced only slightly. For the 1980s, however, including Japan renders these two models useless. The adjusted R 2 s fall to near zero and none of the coefficients is even close to statistical significance; in fact, those for the change measures of the dependent variables have the wrong sign. This suggests that, for the 1980-1990 period, the utility of the linear models depends on excluding Japan from the analysis. Because of the country's peculiar institutional arrangements, noted earlier, I believe this is justified. Also, examination of the residuals strongly suggests Japan to be an outlier. Furthermore, with Japan excluded, the regression results are very stable, considering the small number of cases. To check this, I used the '~ackknife" diagnostic procedure for the unemployment-mediated model (see Miller, 1974) . For each of the dependent variables the equation was reestimated 15 times, each time with one country dropped (Japan was always omitted). The coefficients for the labor organization and unemployment variables as well as the R 2 s were highly consistent.
THE RAW DATA
To more clearly delineate the strengths and weaknesses of the unemploymentmediated model compared with the simple linear and political models, it is useful to look at the raw data on wage behavior and inflation for the 1974-1979 and 1980-1990 periods. These are shown in Tables 4 and 5 . For ease of exposition, labor movements and the unemployment context are each grouped into two categories: encompassing and localized, and high and low. For labor organization, the cutoff is .5 on Cameron's concentration index (see Table 2 above). For unemployment I use 6%. One exception to the latter is New Zealand during the 1980s, which I classify as a high unemployment case. Although the country's jobless rate averaged only 4.8% during that decade, this represented such a dramatic increase compared with previous levels (an average ofless than 1 % during the 1960s and 1970s) that it is likely to have been perceived by unions as very high.
The observed patterns correspond quite well with the predictions of the unemployment-mediated linear model. Several are worth highlighting. First, encompassing labor movements in a low unemployment context and localized unions in a high unemployment context exhibited comparable wage behavior during both periods. Not surprisingly, inflation rates were likewise similar. This suggests, contrary to the simple linear model, that localized unions are no less able than encompassing unions to restrain wages, provided the unemployment context is conducive. An exception to this pattern is Italy during the 1974-1979 period, where extremely high wage increases occurred des!,ite high unemployment. IfItaly is omitted from the average for its group, Table 4 The Raw Data, 1974 Data, -1979 the overall pattern conforms more closely to what the unemployment-mediated model predicts. Second, the four countries with localized unions in a low unemployment context exhibited substantial wage militancy during the 1974-1979 period. Consequently, they suffered much higher average inflation rates than did nations in the other groups. The differing wage behavior of localized unions in high and low unemployment contexts again illustrates the weakness of the simple linear model. In failing to take into account the importance of the Table 5 The Raw Data, 1980 Data, -1990 unemployment level, this model ignores an important mediating factor in labor organization's effect on wage developments. Third, during the 1980s encompassing labor movements were more successful than their localized counterparts at achieving wage restraint within a high unemployment context. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands exhibited considerable moderation in that decade; nominal unit labor costs increased much less rapidly than in the seven high unemployment nations with localized unions. As a result, the former enjoyed substantially lower rates of inflation than the latter, despite similar unemployment levels.
Finally, among countries with encompassing labor movements, wage increases during the 1980s were more moderate in circumstances of high unemployment and rightist government than in a context of low unemployment and left government. In Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands unemployment averaged nearly 9% and leftist parties held, on average, less than 20% of the cabinet seats during the 1980s. In Austria, Finland, Norway, and Sweden the jobless rate averaged only 3.4% and parties of the Left held 60% of the cabinet positions. Yet the former group of countries exhibited a noticeably superior degree of wage moderation. This directly contradicts the political model's assertion that wage restraint by encompassing unions is a product of some sort of "political exchange" with government. This hypothesis was impossible to assess empirically during the 1960s and 1970s because encompassing unions almost invariably coexisted with sympathetic governments and low unemployment. However, developments in the 1980s suggest that it is mistaken. As the unemployment-mediated model contends, the combination of encompassing unions with a high unemployment context produces greater wage restraint than the other three institutional configurations. The pronounced difference between the wage behavior of encompassing unions in a high unemployment context and their counterparts in a low unemployment environment also once again emphasizes the advantages of a model that incorporates unemployment as a mediating factor in the relationship between labor organization, wages, and macroeconomic performance.
NAIRU AND THE MISERY INDEX
According to the unemployment-mediated model, encompassing unionization lowers what economists call the nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU)-the level of unemployment at which countries can achieve moderate, stable inflation. Nations with localized union movements are able to achieve either low unemployment or moderate inflation, but not both. Low unemployment induces wage militancy, leading to high inflation rates. To keep inflation in check, such countries must resort to high levels of joblessness. By contrast, nations with encompassing labor movements can pursue full employment without fear of runaway inflation. They can also, if they wish, achieve very low inflation levels by raising the unemployment rate somewhat.
Thus the benefits of encompassing unionism should be most visible if we look at the sum of inflation and unemployment rates, commonly referred to as the misery index (or Okun index). Misery index levels should be substan- Table 6 Regression Results for Misery Index Levels 1974-1979 1980-1990 tially lower in nations with encompassing labor movements. This, indeed, is the case for the 15 countries. As Table 6 shows, the coefficients for the labor organization variable (Cameron's union concentration index) as a predictor of misery index levels are very large and significant. The parabolic and political models perform reasonably well here, with coefficients in each case having the expected sign and in several instances reaching significance.
Nevertheless, as the adjusted R 2 s indicate, these two models are much less successful in accounting for variation in misery index levels than the unemployment-mediated linear model.
REGRESSION RESULTS WITH CONTROL VARIABLES
It is conceivable that the results discovered here are spurious, a product of other variables for which I have not controlled. To assess this possibility, I reestimated the regression equations for the unemployment-mediated model as a predictor of average inflation rates during 1974-1979 and 1980-1990, incorporating several control variables. Over the long run, inflation is a function of money supply increases that exceed increases in production (Friedman & Schwartz, 1982) . Presumably, then, I should include a control variable representing change in the nominal money supply. Actually, however, that depends on the view one holds regarding the sources of money supply growth. According to orthodox economic logic, monetary authorities determine the rate of money supply increase autonomously; the money stock is treated as exogenous. If that is an accurate assumption, it is indeed necessary to control for money supply changes in the analysis. An alternative view is that central bank decisions regarding the money supply tend to be made in response to economic trends, such as changes in wages or investment demand (Gordon, 1975; Moore, 1979) . For instance, to avoid a recession, monetary authorities may be forced to accommodate wage militancy by permitting a substantial expansion of the money supply. A careful empirical study of money supply patterns in 12 of the countries examined here finds considerable support for this interpretation (Willett, Banaian, Laney, Merzkani, & Warga, 1988) . This suggests that institutional factors such as labor organization will affect inflation in part via changes in the money supply. Hence a good result for the model with a money supply variable included can be interpreted as providing very strong support for its explanatory capacity.
Other variables that may influence inflation outcomes include income equality (the share of national income going to the poorest fifth of the popUlation divided by that accruing to the richest fifth), economic openness (average of exports and imports as a share of GDP), and growth of government spending. Egalitarian distributive arrangements may foster a greater willingness on the part of the workforce to do what is necessary to succeed in international competition, including holding wage increases in line with productivity growth (Kenworthy, 1995a (Kenworthy, , 1995b . Nations that heavily rely on exports and imports are more vulnerable to imported inflation. Rapid growth of government expenditures may heighten inflation by causing an increase in taxes or interest rates, which firms may pass along to consumers in the form of higher prices, or by producing excessive demand (Lindbeck, 1983; Peacock & Ricketts, 1978).19 To assess the robustness of the unemployment-mediated model, I ran regressions for inflation using all possible combinations oflabor organization (Cameron's union concentration index) and unemployment with these four control variables. Table 7 shows the results for the basic model alone (equation A), for the model with each of the control variables added separately (B through E), and for the best performing combination of the variables (F). The model turns out to be quite robust. The coefficients for the labor organization variable are consistently large and significant, even with the change in money supply variable included. The same is true of the unemployment variable for the 1980s.
19. Two additional factors that may influence inflation are central bank independence and government partisanship (Suzuki, 1993) . Both, however, are expected to have their effects via changes in the money supply, in government spending, or both. Hence they are effectively controlled for in this analysis. Note. Standardized coefficients. N = 15. For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 1 and the appendix.
a. LO = labor organization.
b. N = 14 for equations that include the change in government spending variable (New Zealand missing).
*p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01 (one-tailed test).
The findings for the control variables are mixed. Faster money supply growth is strongly associated with higher inflation during both time periods. The income equality variable is also significant for the 1974-1979 period (when the money supply variable is included), and rapid growth of government spending is associated with higher inflation during the 1980s. Economic openness appears to have no effect on inflation rates. The best model for each time period does fairly well in explanatory terms, accounting for around two thirds of the cross-national variation in inflation (adjusted for degrees of freedom).
CONCLUSIONS
The results here support the general thrust of the institutional perspective on unions, wage behavior, and national economic performance, but in a different form than that posited by its currently popular versions. The findings may be summarized as follows:
First, labor organization matters. Given a particular unemployment context, encompassing labor movements are more likely than are localized unions to restrain wage demands. In effect, encompassing unionization lowers the rate of unemployment at which countries can achieve moderate, nonaccelerating inflation. Nations with encompassing unions thus enjoy superior macroeconomic performance, in the form of lower misery index levels.
Second, developments during the 1980s suggest that the unemployment context matters. Countries with localized union movements can achieve a substantial degree of wage restraint by keeping the unemployment rate high, and high unemployment accentuates the degree of restraint exercised by encompassing unions. The simple linear model is thus inaccurate. The stagflationary episode of the mid-to late 1970s may be viewed as an exception in this respect.
Third, the relationship between labor movement encompassingness and wage moderation is linear. The parabolic model favored by Calmfors and Driffill and others is not supported by the comparative data. Nor is restraint by encompassing unions conditional on the presence of leftist government or low unemployment. The cross-national evidence is not consistent with the political model advanced by Lange and Garrett and implicit in the work of many others.
Fourth, these findings apply only to the post-1973 years. For the 1960-1973 period, labor organization appears not to have been a factor in varying wage developments and macroeconomic performance.
Finally, Japan is an important exception, at least for the 1980s. Japanese restraint suggests that employer-guided coordination of wage bargaining may serve as an effective substitute for union encompassingness, as Soskice (1990) has recently argued.
Centralized wage negotiations have come under increasing pressure in a number of countries during the past decade, a result both of employer hostility and of heightened divisions within labor movements. A high degree of union concentration appears to have fostered continued restraint in many instances, but whether that will persist is unclear. This suggests a need for continuing reevaluation of the relationship between labor organization, wage behavior~ and economic performance, and also, in my view, for more detailed descriptive studies focusing on developments within particular nations. For discussion see Swank (1992) .
Change in currency outside banks plus demand deposits other than those of the central government. Data for 1962 Data for -1990 are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1992 , pp. 78-79), for 1960 -1961 from IMF (1990 .
Share of national income going to the poorest quintile of households divided by that accruing to the richest quintile. Data for all countries except Austria are from the World Bank (1991 and 1989, Table 30 ). Data for Austria are from Freeman (1989, pp. 176, 182) . The most common measure of income (in)equality, the Gini coefficient, is not used here because data for Austria are not available for the middle three quintiles of the income distribution.
Average of exports and imports as a share of gross domestic product (GDP). From OECD (1992, Tables 6.12 and 6.13).
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Change in the consumer price index. From OECD (1992, 
